We analyze the main dynamical properties of the evolutionarily stable strategy ESS for asymmetric two-population games of finite size in its corresponding replicator dynamics. We introduce a defnition of ESS for two-population asymmetric games and a method of symmetrizing such an asymmetric game. Then, we show that every strategy profile of the asymmetric game corresponds to a strategy in the symmetric game, and that every Nash equilibrium (NE) of the asymmetric game corresponds to a (symmetric) NE of the symmetric version game. So, we study (standard) replicator dynamics for the asymmetric game and define corresponding (non-standard) dynamics of the symmetric game.
Introduction
Evolutionary dynamics was originally motivated by biology, then for economics and concerns pairwise random matching of individuals drawn from a single infinitely large population, and usually playing a symmetric game. Evolutionary stability, introduced by Maynard Smith and Price (1973) , is a criterion for the robustness of an incumbent strategy against the entry of individuals or mutants using a different strategy. The framework considered is a conflict within a homogenous population (a symmetric game). A game in normal form is symmetric if all players have the same strategy set, and the payoff to playing a given strategy depends only on the strategies being played, not on who plays them.
Nevertheless, many economic applications come from attention for multi-population rather than single-population dynamics on asymmetric environments. So, in most applications, the game is not going to be symmetric and involve at least two players with different strategies and each player role is represented by a different population in the spirit of Nash's (1950) "mass action interpretation" where each type of player being drawn from his or her "player-role population". For instance, the player roles may be those individuals of buyers and sellers, incumbents and entrants in oligopolistic markets, workers and firms, or the social relationships between migrants and residents; all of them with non-homogeneous behaviors about the state of the economy or different attitudes towards -and perceptions about -development efforts or environmental quality of the state of the economy and so forth.
Recall that, from the framework of symmetric games, there is a seminal refinement of the Nash equilibrium (N E) concept that is the notion of Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) (see Maynard Smith and Price (1973) , Maynard Smith (1974) ). From it, we known that every ESS is at the same time, a stable strategy against mutants, i.e., is robust when is invaded by a small population playing a different strategy, and asymptotically stable steady state in the associated replicator dynamics. Hence, the relationship between N E, ESS and the steady states (SS) on this replicator dynamic, are well known (see Weibull (1995) ).
Hence, in this paper, we consider the evolution of two populations facing a conflictive situation being modeled by an asymmetric normal form game. Analyzing the evolution and stability of the behaviors of the populations involved in asymmetric games is the main purpose of this work. In this vein, we should symmetrize the asymmetric game because it give us, the possibility to characterize the ESS using the well known properties of these strategies for the cases of symmetric games.
Then, we extend the concept of ESS for asymmetric two-population games, equivalently in the definition of Selten (1980) and Samuelson (1998) but in those papers was not analyzed the evolutionary dynamics of such a population. More close to our argument is the work of Fishman (2008) , nevertheless our approach is quite different, since by symmetrizing the game we get the advantage of generalizing the standard definition of ESS and its relationship existing between stability of the dynamical equilibria corresponding to the replicator dynamics, and their strategic stability for the case of asymmetric games. Note that, much of the topic of this paper can be generalized for cases of finite asymmetric populations on n > 2, however to simplify notation, generally, we shall consider the case of two-player asymmetric populations.
To sum up, our approach allow us to characterize in an unified way the main characteristics of the ESS for the asymmetric cases. Following this approach it is straightforward to see that in 1 asymmetric games, a strategic profile is an ESS if and only if is a strict Nash equilibrium (see Balkenborg and Schlag (1995) , (2007); Samuelson (1998) ; Selten (1980) ; Weibull (1995) ) and that every ESS is an asymptotically stable steady state of the replicator dynamic (see Retchkiman (2007); Samuelson and Zhang (1992) ) and other results.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 draws the notation and basic definitions to set up the baseline model, namely a two-player asymmetric normal-form game. Section 3 defines the ESS for our model. In section 4, we introduce the symmetric version of an asymmetric two population game. Section 5 studies the dynamics from our model. Section 6 states the relationships between ESS, N E and SS. Section 7 draws some concluding remarks.
The model
Let us denote by G a normal-form (strategic) game with a player set composed by individuals that comprise τ populations, namely residents, R, and migrants, M : τ = {R, M }. Each population splits in different clubs denoted by n τ i and i = 1,
). The split depends on the strategy agents play or the behavior that agents follow. Strategies are in correspondence with the clubs, individuals belonging to the n τ i club will be called n i −strategists. Thus, the set S τ of pure strategies are:
Individuals belong only to one club in each period of time, but they can move from one club to another at the beginning of every period.
For each population τ ∈ {M, R} we represent the set of mixed strategies by: 
The normal form representation for our described game, is given by the next matrix payoff:
where a ij denotes the payoff of an i−strategist from population R playing against a j−strategist from population M . Conversely for b ij from M to R. The matching between individuals from different population is given in a random way. We use the notation:
to represent the i−strategist's expected payoff who belongs to the n i −club from population R given that the fitness of strategists conform the clubs' distribution in y for the opposite population, M . Analogously, the expected payoff of the i−strategist belonging to n i −club from population M is given by:
where x is the clubs' distribution for the other population, R. Rational individuals follow the strategic profile that maximize the expected payoffs. A more general case with n different populations can be considered by extending this model. In this case we consider a set of n populations indexed by τ = {p 1 h club, or equivalently, the percentage of individuals in the population p s , following the h pure strategy or behavior, 1 ≤ h ≤ n s . So, the expected value for each strategist, in each population p i ∈ τ will be denoted by:
where b i h i j 1 ...j n denotes the payoff of an h pure strategist from the population p i , given that the individuals from the population p s = p i are playing according with j s , s = i, pure strategy or behavior. However, without loss of generality, to simplify notation we shall work on the case of a two-population normal form games.
The asymmetric game and the definition of ESS
Consider the above two-population normal form game:
where each population splits into clubs denoted by n τ i , ∀ τ = {R, M } and i = 1, ..., k τ . Hence:
• The population of residents is the set:
• The population of migrants is the set:
Let p ∈ ∆ τ be the profile distribution of individuals' behavior from population R, in a given period of time t 0 , and that in the same time, the profile distribution of individuals' behavior in population M is q ∈ ∆ τ . Assume that in a post-period of time t 1 > t 0 a small mutation affects the individuals' behavior from population M . Hence, the profile distribution from population M after the mutation, is denoted by the offspring:
which is called the fitness of the post-entry population. Analogously, the profile distribution from population R after suffering a small mutation is:
Now, we can state the next definition: 
for all , 0 < ≤¯ , where p * = (1 − )p * + p and q * = (1 − )q * + q, are the respective post-entry populations.
So, individuals' behavior who adopt an ESS brings more offspring (with higher fitness) than the mutant individuals' behavior from the post-entry population.
Definition 1 can be extended to the case of multipopulation models. For such cases we consider
., m is a distribution of probability over the set of clubs or pure strategies, for each population. So, x * is an ESS if and only if for eachx = x * , there exist an q > 0 such that the following inequalities hold:
The following theorem characterizes the ESS in terms of Nash equilibria (see, for instance, Swinkels J., 1992).
Proposition 1 A profile x is ESS if and only if x is a strict Nash equilibrium.
The evolutive properties of the ESS and its relationship with the set of Nash equilibria and the stationary states (SS) of the replicator dynamics for the case of symmetric games are well known (see Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998); Weibull (1995) ). Then, with the purpose of analyzing the dynamical properties of the ESS, let us introduce the symmetric (one-population) version for the asymmetric two-population game, G. 4 The symmetrized game, the N E and ESS Consider, the asymmetric two-population normal form game G defined by (2) (2) , consider:
2. Individuals from the big population P face their own population.
Let
be the set of pure strategy for P.
The matrix payoff for the big population P is:
Hence, the numbered list item 1-4 characterizes the symmetrized game version G s = {P , N , Π} of the asymmetric game G.
Much of the work on evolution has been studied for the case of a single homogeneous population playing a symmetric game like G s . For this reason, our interest is to use the well know properties of the symmetric games, and so to obtain the main characteristics of the ESS in an asymmetric (original) games. This will be doing by using the symmetrized version of the asymmetric game. Then, for each asymmetric two-population game G, there exists a corresponding symmetric version as defined by G s . It is worth to note that, these two versions are not equivalent in several aspects, 1 but as we shall show every Nash equilibrium of the asymmetric game is a Nash equilibrium of the symmetric version. Hence, our purpose is to characterize the main dynamics properties of the ESS, and to do this we do not need a full equivalence between these two versions.
Let us consider the strategic profile (p, q) ∈ ∆ p ×∆ q , the profile distribution x = (x 1 , ..., x k R +k M ) verifying the following identities:
(where by |·| we denote the cardinality on the sets R and M defining the corresponding mixed strategy for the symmetric version G s .
Proposition 2 For each strategic profile (p, q) ∈ ∆ R × ∆ M , there exists a mixed strategy x ∈ ∆ P of the corresponding one-population game, and reciprocally.
Proof. Let (p, q) ∈ ∆ R × ∆ M be a strategic profile for the asymmetric game. Consider x ∈ ∆ P given by the expression (5), i.e. x = |R| |M |+|R| p, |M | |M |+|R| q . Thus, x is a mixed strategy for the symmetric game. To see the reciprocal, suppose that x ∈ ∆ P and consider the above equalities but in the opposite sense, since
Now, let us denote by B τ (z) the set of best replies for the population τ ∈ {M, R}, where the profile distribution over the clubs in the opposite population τ = τ is given by z, and τ ∈ {M, R}.
The following propositions offer an insight about the relationship between the set of N E and the set of ESS for asymmetric games and their respective symmetric versions. ) be the corresponding strategy in the corresponding symmetrized one-population game (Definition 2). Then, note that p * ∈ B R (q * ) and q * ∈ B M (p * ) implies that x * P x * ≥ yP x * for all y ∈ ∆ P . To see this, consider that for each y ∈ ∆ P the following relations:
Proposition 4
If the profile (p * , q * ) a strict Nash equilibrium for the asymmetric two population game, then the corresponding x * is a strict Nash equilibrium for the symmetric version.
Proof. Let (p * , q * ) be a strict Nash equilibrium for the asymmetric two population game and let x * the corresponding profile for the symmetric version. Assume that there there exist y = x * ∈ ∆ p , such that yΠx * = x * Πx * then, using proposition 2, there exist p = p * such that pAq * ≥ p * Aq * or, there exist q = q * such that p * Bq ≥ p * Bq, contradicting our assumption.
Proposition 5 If the profile (p * , q * ) is an ESS for the asymmetric two-population game, then the corresponding x * is an ESS for the symmetric version.
Proof. Let (p * , q * ) be an ESS, then by proposition (1) is a strict Nash equilibrium. Now, from proposition (4) the corresponding strategy x * is a strict Nash equilibrium for the symmetric version, and then ESS.
Remark 1 It is straightforward to see that the reciprocal of this proposition does not hold.
Recall that, the symmetric version and the original asymmetric game are not fully equivalent, but our main interest is to characterize the dynamical properties of the solutions for asymmetric games. So, as long as the solutions of an asymmetric game are still solutions of the symmetric version, we can use this version with this purpose.
6
Then, the dynamical system (6) has a corresponding dynamical system, namely the replicator dynamics, (see Taylor and Jonker, 1978) of the symmetric one-population game given by:
where e i is the i − th canonical vector in k R +k M . To study the relationship between N E, ESS and SS for the system (6) of the asymmetric game, G, can be done by means of analyzing the dynamics corresponding to the symmetric version game, G s , from its replicator dynamics (7) .
The following propositions are straightforward from the respective definitions:
Proposition 6 If a pair (p,q) is a stationary state for the system (6) then the correspondingx is a stationary state for the dynamical system (7).
Proposition 7 Every strictly positive stationary state of the dynamical system (6) is a N E for the corresponding asymmetric two-population game.

Proposition 8 Every N E of an asymmetric two-population game is a stationary state for its corresponding dynamical system given by (6).
Hence, we can conclude that the set of N E of an asymmetric two-population game is a subset of the set SS corresponding to the dynamical system (6).
Corollary 1 Every N E of a two-population game is a stationary state for the corresponding dynamical system (7).
Proof. By propositions (8) and (6) the corollary follows.
6 Evolutionarily stable strategies and Liapunov's stability Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988) pointed out a proof that for non-homogeneous asymmetric two population games, interior points cannot be asymptotically stable steady states of the replicator dynamics. On the other hand, we know that the concepts of strict Nash equilibrium and ESS are equivalents in symmetric games. We shall prove using the symmetric version of an asymmetric game, that every ESS is an asymptotically stable steady state of the replicator dynamics.
Let us give a proper analysis from our model. We denote by AS the set of asymptotically stable steady states.
From the definition of ESS (Definition 1) in the case of an asymmetric two-population game and from the propositions (3), (6) and (8), and using the well known relations between ESS, N E and SS for the symmetric cases (see Weibull (1995) ), the following relationship holds for every asymmetric two-population game:
and N E ⊆ SS. 
Assume that a perturbation affects the distribution p * and that in the population R some j−strategist appear. So, the post-entry population in time t is p (t) = (1 − (t))p * + (t)e R j . Substituting in the j − th differential equation in the system (6) we obtain:ṗ
Let us now define
. Now considering (in equation (10)), the first order approximation it follows that:
So, in the population R the members in the n R j club increase, contradicting our claim that (p * , q * ) is an asymptotically stable steady state with n R j = 0. We turn now to the connection between ESS and the replicator dynamics in an asymmetric game. We will use the following proposition, see Taylor The following corollary holds:
Corollary 2 For the asymmetric two-population game we obtain the following chain of inclusions:
ESS ⊆ AS ⊆ N E ⊆ SS.
Proof. Let (p * , q * ) be an ESS for an asymmetric game and let x * be the corresponding strategic profile in its symmetric version. So, by Proposition 1, it follows that (p * , q * ) is a strict Nash equilibrium. By Proposition 4, it follows that the symmetric strategic profile of every strict Nash equilibrium of an asymmetric game is an strict N E. Then x * is an strict Nash equilibrium for the symmetric version, and then x * is a ESS. Now, by Proposition 10, it follows that x * is an asymptotically stable steady state of the replicator dynamics. Then, (p * q * ) is an asymptotically stable steady state for the asymmetric version, so being a N E. Bomze, I. (1986) shows that every asymptotically stable steady state in the homogeneous population replicator dynamic corresponds to a Nash equilibrium that is trembling hand. However, from our model using the symmetric version (Definition 2) of a non-homogeneous asymmetric n−population the following proposition follows:
Proposition 11 Every ESS of a non-homogeneous asymmetric n−population game is trembling hand and isolate.
Proof. Let (p * , q * ) be an ESS for an asymmetric game and let x * be the corresponding strategic profile in its symmetric version. By Corollary 2 it follows that every ESS is asymptotically stable for the symmetric version. So, x * is asymptotically stable steady state for the symmetric version. Now, taking account the above result due to Bomze (1986) , it follows that x * is trembling hand and isolate equilibrium, and so (p * , q * ) verifies this property in the original asymmetric game.
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we extended the definition of evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) of symmetric games to asymmetric two-population games. We made this by taking as the strategy space for the symmetrized game the union of strategies from the two-population asymmetric game and assigning zero payoff to all strategy combinations that belong to the same player position in the asymmetric game. With this symmetrized game, we show again some well-known relationships between static and dynamic stability notions.
Hence, evolutionary dynamics in a two-population asymmetric game can be analyzed using the well known properties of the replicator dynamic corresponding to the symmetric version of this game. This fact, may have interest for economic theory, or social analysis, where asymmetric games are useful to analyze the behavior of two populations engaged in non-cooperative games such as, buyers and suppliers, firms and workers or residents and migrants populations interacting in a given country or economy. The reference of the symmetric version from an asymmetric two-population games allow us to generalize the results given in the existing literature.
